

## Message Text

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TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER)

SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIAL

1. HERewith FULL TEXT LESLIE H. GELB BYLINER PAGE FOUR  
NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, MAY 28 HEADLINED "U.S. AND SOVIET  
HOPE TO SET NEW CURB ON ATOM TESTS NEXT MONTH."
2. WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW ARE PUSHING HARD TOWARD A NEW LIM-  
ITATION ON NUCLEAR TESTS, HOPING TO HAVE IT READY FOR  
SIGNING AT THE SUMMIT MEETING SCHEDULED FOR MOSCOW NEXT  
MONTH. BUT ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS CONCEDE THAT THE  
AGREEMENT IS DESIGNED MORE TO SHOW THAT EAST-WEST ACCOMMODA-  
TION IS STILL WORKING THAN TO HAVE ANY REAL IMPACT ON ARMS  
CONTROL.
3. THE PACT TERMED A "THRESHOLD" TREATY, WOULD PROHIBIT  
UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS ABOVE AN AGREED LEVEL, OR THRES-  
HOLD, OF EXPLOSIVE POWER. IN THE PAST THE UNITED STATES  
AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE PRONOUNCED SUCH AGREEMENTS IN-  
ADEQUATE AND OFFICIALS ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE PROJECTED AC-  
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CORD WILL NOT PREVENT EITHER SIDE FROM DEVELOPING A HOST OF  
NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

4. PRESIDENT NIXON AND LEONID I. BREZHNEV, THE SOVIET

COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER, DECIDED TO PURSUE THIS NEW ARRANGEMENT FOR CURBING TESTS, INFORMED OFFICIALS SAY, ONLY AFTER A TREATY ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS, WHICH THEY REALLY WANTED AND HOPED TO SIGN AT THE MOSCOW MEETING, APPEARED IN DOUBT.

5. THEIR GOAL, THE OFFICIALS SAID, IS TO ANNOUNCE AT THEIR MEETING AN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON A "THRESHOLD" TREATY. BOTH NATIONS ARE PARTIES TO THE 1963 TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, IN SPACE AND UNDER THE SEAS.

6. OFFICIALS OF DIFFERENT AGENCIES AND OF DIFFERENT RANKS HAVE PROVIDED THE NEW YORK TIMES WITH ACCOUNTS OF HOW THE THRESHOLD TREATY, LONG DISCOUNTED BY BOTH SIDES, CAME TO LIFE AND HAVE GIVEN DETAILS OF A 200-PAGE INTERAGENCY STUDY THAT WILL LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR SOVIET-AMERICAN AGREEMENT.

7. THE MAIN POINTS OF THESE ACCOUNTS INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

THE INITIATIVE FOR GOING AHEAD WITH A THRESHOLD TREATY CAME FROM MOSCOW AFTER SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER ONCE AGAIN REJECTED A PROPOSAL BY MR. BREZHNEV FOR A BAN ON ALL NUCLEAR TESTING.

THE REASON FOR MR. KISSINGER'S REJECTION OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WAS HIS CONCERN THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD APPEAR TO BE JOINING THE SOVIET UNION IN PUTTING PRESSURE ON CHINA TO END HER NUCLEAR TESTING.

MOST OF THE OPTIONS EXAMINED IN THE INTERAGENCY STUDY WOULD ALLOW BOTH SIDES TO CONTINUE TO TEST MOST OF THE WEAPONS THEY ARE INTERESTED IN DEVELOPING.

A BUREAUCRATIC FIGHT WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WILL PIT UNCLASSIFIED

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THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, THE PENTAGON AND ALLIES OF THE NUCLEAR RESEARCH LABORATORIES, WHICH OPPOSE FURTHER LIMITS ON TESTING, AGAINST THE STATE DEPARTMENT, THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF, WHICH FAVOR NEW LIMITS.

8. CONCERN ABOUT OTHERS. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS HAVE SOUGHT IN VARIOUS PUBLIC TALKS TO LINK AMERICAN INTEREST IN EXTENDING THE BAN ON NUCLEAR TESTING TO GROWING CONCERN OVER POSSIBLE ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY OTHER NATIONS. THEY HAVE CITED THE FACT THAT THOSE NATIONS THAT HAVE NOT SIGNED OR RATIFIED THE 1972 TREATY TO LIMIT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS MIGHT USE THE FAILURE OF THE

SUPERPOWERS TO BAN ALL TESTING AS AN EXCUSE TO GO NUCLEAR THEMSELVES.

9. BUT INFORMED SOURCES SAY MR. KISSINGER BELIEVES THAT DECISION BY OTHER COUNTRIES ON WHETHER TO GO NUCLEAR ARE NOT LIKELY TO BE AFFECTED APPRECIABLY BY SOVIET AND AMERICAN DECISIONS ON NUCLEAR TESTING. IN MR. KISSINGER'S MIND, THE SOURCES SAID, THE KEY TO OTHER NATIONS' GOING NUCLEAR IS DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURES, NOT SUPERPOWER CONFLICTS.

10. MORE THAN 100 NATIONS HAVE SUBSCRIBED TO THE 1963 TREATY IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION AND BRITAIN AGREED TO A BAN ON NUCLEAR TESTS EVERYWHERE EXCEPT UNDERGROUND. OVER THE NEXT 11 YEARS, NEGOTIATIONS TO EXTEND THAT TREATY PROCEEDED AT A LEISURELY PACE. THEIR FOCAL POINT HAS BEEN THE GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, A FORUM OF MANY PARTICIPANTS IN WHICH MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON ACCUSED EACH OTHER OF INDULGING IN PROPAGANDA EXERCISES.

11. DURING THIS PERIOD, WASHINGTON HAS, BY OFFICIAL PUBLIC COUNTS CONDUCTED 255 UNDERGROUND TESTS AT A COST OF ABOUT \$3.5-BILLION. MOSCOW HAS SET OFF AT LEAST 90 SUCH EXPLOSIONS. THE PURPOSES OF THESE TESTS ARE TO DEVELOP NEW NUCLEAR WARHEADS, TO SAMPLE NUCLEAR STOCKPILES FOR RELIABILITY AND TO STUDY RADIATION AND BLAST EFFECTS.

12. THEN, IN MARCH, MR. KISSINGER FLEW TO MOSCOW WITH THE UNCLASSIFIED

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ANNOUNCED GOAL OF ACHIEVING A "CONCEPTUAL BREAKTHROUGH" IN THE STALLED NEGOTIATIONS ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON, ANATOLY F. DOBRYNIN, HAD LED MR. KISSINGER TO BELIEVE THAT SUCH A BREAKTHROUGH WAS LIKELY, PARTICULARLY ON LIMITING THE DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES WITH MULTIPLE WARHEADS. BUT LITTLE PROGRESS WAS MADE.

13. ON THE LAST DAY OF MR. KISSINGER'S VISIT, MR. BREZHNEV SWITCHED SUBJECTS AND PROPOSED A TOTAL TEST BAN. THIS HAD BEEN THE STANDARD SOVIET LINE OVER THE YEARS; MR. KISSINGER GAVE THE STANDARD RESPONSE -- NO TOTAL BAN WITHOUT ON-SITE INSPECTION BY AMERICANS ON SOVIET SOIL.

14. TECHNOLOGY IS CITED. HE RECITED THE FAMILIAR AMERICAN ARGUMENT THAT UNDERGROUND EXPLOSIONS OF THE EQUIVALENT OF 50,000 TONS OF TNT, MORE THAN TWO AND A HALF TIMES THE FORCE OF THE BOMB DETONATED OVER HIROSHIMA IN 1945, COULD BE READILY DETECTED BY SEISMOGRAPH, BUT COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED AS NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS AS OPPOSED TO EARTHQUAKES. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE

TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES AND ONE SET OFF TO TEST WEAPON DEVELOPMENT.

15. MR. BREZHNEV REPEATED SOVIET OBJECTIONS TO ON-SITE INSPECTIONS TO VERIFY TESTS. HE ARGUED -- AS HAVE MANY AMERICAN SCIENTISTS -- THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENTLY ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY TO MAKE PRECISE JUDGMENTS ABOUT THE NATURE OF UNDERGROUND TREMORS DOWN TO LESS THAN 10 KILOTONS -- THOUSANDS OF TONS. ON-SITE INSPECTION, HE CONCLUDED, IS UNNECESSARY.

16. MR. KISSINGER COUNTERED WITH ANOTHER OBJECTION TO A TOTAL BAN, AN OBJECTION THAT HE HAD MADE MANY TIMES, BUT PRIVATELY.

17. WASHINGTON, HE SAID, WOULD NOT SIGN ANY AGREEMENT THAT WOULD SERVE TO ISOLATE CHINA. THIS, MR. KISSINGER BELIEVED, WAS THE REAL PURPOSE BEHIND THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A TOTAL BAN. CHINA, HE KNEW, WAS NOT LIKELY TO HALT UNCLASSIFIED

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HER RELATIVELY NEW NUCLEAR TESTING PROGRAM. MR. KISSINGER DID NOT WANT TO SEEM TO BE TEAMING WITH MOSCOW TO PUT PRESSURE ON PEKING TO HALT ITS WEAPON TESTS.

18. MR. KISSINGER, THEREFORE, COUNTERED WITH A PROPOSAL OF HIS OWN -- A "THRESHOLD" APPROACH THAT MIGHT ALLOW TESTS 50 TO 100 KILOTONS, CONDUCTED IN HOLES LINED AND COVERED WITH SAND AND GRAVEL.

19. NO DIRECT RESPONSE. MR. BREZHNEV DID NOT RESPOND TO MR. KISSINGER'S SUGGESTION DIRECTLY. HE DID SAY THAT AN AGREEMENT IN THIS AREA WAS IMPORTANT AND THAT IT SHOULD BE READIED FOR THE SUMMER SUMMIT CONFERENCE.

20. TWO WEEKS LATER, ON APRIL 12, FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI A. GROMYKO CAME TO WASHINGTON AND SAID THAT MOSCOW WOULD NEGOTIATE A THRESHOLD TREATY. HE DID NOT ADD THE HERETOFORE INVARIABLE PHRASE: "AND, OF COURSE, WE WANT A MORATORIUM ON ALL OTHER TESTING." MR. GROMYKO UNDERLINED MR. BREZHNEV'S PLEA TO HAVE SOMETHING READY FOR THE SUMMIT MEETING.

21. IN THE MEANTIME, MR. KISSINGER HAD SPURRED WORK ON THE INTERAGENCY STUDY, BEGUN IN FEBRUARY, ON WHAT TO DO ABOUT NUCLEAR TESTING. HE DIRECTED THAT THE STUDY EXAMINE FIVE OPTIONS, WITH THE FOCUS ON A THRESHOLD TREATY. THE OPTIONS: DOING NOTHING; WORKING OUT A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN; ESTABLISHING VARIOUS THRESHOLDS, WITH SUBOPTIONS PERMITTING A NUMBER OF TESTS OF STRENGTH ABOVE THE AGREED THRESHOLD; ESTABLISHING THRESHOLDS WITH QUOTAS ON

THE NUMBER OF TESTS TO BE ALLOWED; AND SETTING AN OVERALL SEISMIC TOTAL, WITH EACH SIDE FREE TO CARRY OUT ANY COMBINATION OF BIG OR SMALL EXPLOSIONS WITHIN THAT TOTAL.

22. THE THRESHOLDS EXAMINED IN THE STUDY RANGE FROM A LOW OF ABOUT 10 KILOTONS TO A HIGH OF ALMOST 400. ALL EXCEPT THE LOWEST RANGES ARE SUFFICIENTLY HIGH TO TEST MOST OF THE SOPHISTICATED TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WARHEADS THAT MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON MAY WISH TO DEPLOY IN THE FUTURE.

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23. THE STUDY WAS COMPLETED TWO WEEKS AGO. AS A RULE, THESE STUDIES MAKE NO RECOMMENDATIONS; THEY ONLY DISCUSS THE PROS AND CONS OF EACH OPTION.

24. BUT A NUMBER OF PERSONS FAMILIAR WITH THE STUDY AND THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS INVOLVED ASSESS THE SITUATION AS FOLLOWS: THERE IS ALMOST NO CHANCE FOR THE TOTAL BAN ON TESTING. AS ONE HIGH OFFICIAL PUT IT: "THE STAFF MEN IN THE MILITARY AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION ARE APOPLECTIC ABOUT IT, AND KISSINGER DOES NOT WANT TO TAKE ON THIS KIND OF FIGHT."

25. THE MAIN OBJECTIONS TO A TOTAL BAN COME FROM THE WEAPONS EXPERTS IN THE GOVERNMENT AND AT THE LOS ALAMOS AND LIVERMORE NUCLEAR LABORATORIES. AN OFFICIAL SAID:

"THESE GUYS BELIEVE THAT A TOTAL BAN WOULD CLOSE DOWN THEIR LABS AND THAT IN AN EMERGENCY THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PUT THE LABS BACK TOGETHER AGAIN IN A SHORT TIME." BROWN

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